In the Outlines of Scepticism, Sextus Empircus defines the Sceptic Way as an ability (δύναμις) to set up oppositions among things which appear to us through sense perceptions and things which are merely thought objects. Since there is no argument which is more convincing than others among the conflicting arguments, the Sceptics, first, come to suspend judgement (ἐποχή) and hold no belief by this ability, and afterwards, towards tranquillity (τὸ δὲ μετὰ τουτο ἐις ἀταρaξiaν) (PH I. 8-10). Then, he points out the aim of Pyrrhonian Scepticism as it is tranquillity (ἀτραξία) in matters of belief (δόχαν) and moderation of feelings in matters constrained us (ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν) (PH I.25). In my research, I will inquire about the possibility of attaining tranquillity by answering several related questions like what is tranquillity? How can one, with such a sceptical ability, attain it? Do sceptics hold any belief? If they do not, how can they attain this tranquillity as an ethical end without any account of “good”? Is the course of attaining tranquillity teachable once a sceptic attains it, or is it something unique to the Sceptics?
In the background of my research, I also consider two main common presuppositions about Pyrrhonian Scepticism, which is thought to be an epistemological position and an ethical school of philosophy. I examine these two presuppositions and argue why it is not an epistemological position and in which sense it is ethical.